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Abstract

In July, 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved Re-ULLCA - the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. The product of a three-year drafting process, heavily
influenced by 13 advisors appointed by the ABA, the new Act brings major innovations to the law of limited
liability companies. This article, written by the two co-reporters for the drafting committee: (i) explains why
the Conference decided to draft a new LLC statute, reviews the process through which the Conference
produced and approved the new Act, and describes the Act's basic architecture; (ii) highlights the Act's major
innovations; and (iii) provides a roadmap through the Act's intricate and all-important provisions concerning
the operating agreement.
The following specific topics are addressed: the operating agreement; the decision to deviate from RUPA and
un-cabin fiduciary duty; returning good faith and fair dealing to the concept's contract law moorings; the
question of an owner's legitimate self-interest; reformulating the duty of care; the question of the shelf LLC;
statutory apparent authority (de-codifying apparent authority by position); statements of authority by
position; templates for management structure; charging orders; a remedy for oppressive conduct; derivative
claims and special litigation committees; organic transactions - mergers, conversions, and domestications; the
decision to eschew the series LLC; and the lot of mere transferees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 13th, 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (“NCCUSL” or “the Conference”) “approved and recommended for
enactment in all the States”1 the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(“Re-ULLCA”). This approval came ten years after the Conference approved the
original Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“ULLCA”) and ended a drafting
process that had itself spanned three years.2
The new Act brings major innovations to the law of limited liability companies,
and NCCUSL has begun actively seeking enactments around the country. This
article seeks to introduce the new Act to business lawyers across the country,3 by:
(i) explaining why NCCUSL decided to draft a new LLC statute, reviewing the
process through which the Conference produced and approved the new Act, and
describing the Act’s basic architecture; (ii) highlighting the Act’s major innovations;
and (iii) providing a roadmap through the Act’s intricate and all-important provisions concerning the operating agreement.

II. WHY A NEW LLC ACT NOW, BY WHOM AND HOW
WAS THE NEW ACT DRAFTED, AND WHAT DOES
THE NEW ACT LOOK LIKE?
A. WHY A NEW LLC ACT NOW?
The new Act’s Prefatory Note contains the most succinct explanation for “Why
a new LLC Act Now?”
1. Re-ULLCA, Cover. Re-ULLCA is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006act_
final.htm.
2. Prefatory Note to Re-ULLCA. See also ULLCA drafting committee website, Welcome from the
Chair, available at http://www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/DesktopDefault.aspx.
3. As will be seen, the Act is already well known to leading practitioners and academics who
have served as ABA Advisors to the Drafting Committee. See infra notes 5–12 and accompanying text
(Part II-B).
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Eighteen years have passed since the IRS issued its gate-opening Revenue Ruling
88-76, declaring that a Wyoming LLC would be taxed as a partnership despite
the entity’s corporate-like liability shield. More than eight years have passed since
the IRS opened the gate still further with the “check the box” regulations. It is
an opportune moment to identify the best elements of the myriad “first generation” LLC statutes and to infuse those elements into a new, “second generation”
uniform act.4

B. BY WHOM AND HOW WAS THE NEW ACT DRAFTED?
The Drafting Committee for Re-ULLCA was chaired by David Walker, Dean
of the Drake Law School, included eight other commissioners, and benefited from
the active participation of 13 advisors appointed by the ABA.5 In addition to the
ABA Advisor,6 the Committee had eight advisors from the Business Law Section,7
three from the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section,8 and one from the
Section on Taxation.9 The current chair of the PUBO Committee was one of the
Business Law Section’s Advisors,10 and the immediate past chair of that Committee was the ABA Advisor.11
As explained in March 2006 newsletter of the ABA Committee on Partnerships
and Unincorporated Business Organizations:
ABA advisors actually outnumbered NCCUSL commissioners on the committee,
and on most votes the committee’s chair counted commissioners and ABA advisors
together as one group. On the rare occasions when the committee seemed significantly
divided, the chair took a formal vote of commissioners (as NCCUSL procedures
require) but then also made note of a vote of the ABA advisors.12

The Drafting Committee also benefited from a scholarly perspective. As is
usual, the co-reporters are law professors. In addition, the chair of the Committee
4. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.
htm#_Toc147562675.
5. The members of the drafting committee are listed at http://www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=49.
6. Robert Keatinge.
7. William J. Callison (from the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations [“PUBO”]), William H. Clark, Jr. (from the Committee on Corporate Laws), Jon T. Hirschoff
(from the Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions), Paul L. Lion, III (from PUBO; also representing the
California State Bar), Scott E. Ludwig (from PUBO), Professor Elizabeth Stone Miller (from PUBO),
Professor Sandra K. Miller (from PUBO), and Thomas E. Rutledge (from PUBO).
8. Professor Thomas Earl Geu, Barry B. Nekritz and Robert Krapf.
9. John R. Maxfield.
10. Professor Elizabeth Stone Miller.
11. Robert Keatinge.
12. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(“ULLCA”) and the Issue of “Corpufuscation,” Vol. XXII, no. 2, PUBOGRAM, at 7 (March 2006) [hereinafter “Progress Report”]. ABA influence was also strong among the commissioners. One was the original
ABA Advisor to the Drafting Committee for RUPA and the first recipient of the PUBO Committee’s
Martin I. Lubaroff Award for contributions to law of unincorporated business organizations (Harry
J. Haynsworth). Another had been the Tax Section’s Advisor to ULLCA and ULPA (2001) (Steven
G. Frost). The ABA’s influence was felt most strongly on the question of “shelf LLCs.” See infra notes
73–84 and accompanying text (Part III-F).
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is a law school dean,13 one of the members is a dean emeritus,14 and another is a
law professor.15 One of the ABA advisors is a business school professor,16 and two
others are law professors.17 Several of the ABA Advisors who are full-time practitioners have also published several articles on LLC law.18 All and all, authors from
the three leading LLC treatises were part of this working group.19
The drafting process spanned three years and included ten drafting committee meetings,20 six drafts,21 and consideration by the entire Conference at four
consecutive annual meetings. Each committee meeting lasted two and a half days,
and many key issues were debated, re-debated and re-debated.22 The Act was
on the annual meeting agenda in 2003 (concept discussion, based on drafting
committee’s briefing memo); 2004 (partial first reading), 2005 (first reading), and
2006 (final reading).23

13. David Walker is Dean of the Drake Law School.
14. Harry Haynsworth is Dean Emeritus of the William Mitchell College of Law.
15. Ann Anker is Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.
16. Sandra Miller is Professor of Accounting and Taxation at Widener University School of Business
Administration.
17. Tom Geu is Professor of Law at University of South Dakota School of Law, and Elizabeth Miller
is Professor of Law at Baylor Law School.
18. William J. Callison, “The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend. . . .”: The Inadequacy of the Gross
Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business Organizations, 94 KY. L.J. 451 (2005–06);
William J. Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 109
(1997); Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationship in Representing Limited Liability
Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV
389 (1995); Robert R. Keatinge, New Gang in Town Limited Liability Companies: An Introduction, 4
BUS. L. TODAY 5 (1995); Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May
Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 205 (2006); and Thomas E.
Rutledge, The Lost Distinction Between Agency and Decisional Authority: Unfortunate Consequences of
the Member-Managed Versus Manager-Managed Distinction in the Limited Liability Company, 93 KY. L.J.
737 (2004–2005).
19. In alphabetical order by author: CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (1994 and Supp. 2006-2); [hereinafter “BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER”]; WILLIAM J. CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE (2006); and LARRY A. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES (2d ed. 2003).
20. The drafting committee met during May 2003 in Atlanta, Georgia; June 2003 via teleconference; November 2003 in Chicago, Illinois; April 2004 in Chicago, Illinois; June 2004 via teleconference; October 2004 in Chicago, Illinois; February 2005 at Phoenix, Arizona; May 2005 via
teleconference; October 2005 via teleconference; and February 2006 via teleconference. See http://
www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=4&tabid=52.
21. http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee = 224.
22. See, e.g., Re-ULLCA, 2006 Annual Meeting Draft [hereinafter “2006 Annual Meeting Draft”],
§ 409, cmt. (discussing the drafting committee’s many-splendored approaches to the duty of care issue) and § 401, cmt. (discussing the committee’s internal debates over the “shelf LLC” issue), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006amdraft.htm.
23. It was highly unusual for the Conference to devote part of an annual meeting to a briefing
memo. However, the chair of the Drafting Committee persuaded the Conference’s leadership that it
was appropriate for the Conference to understand several fundamental conceptual innovations the
Committee planned to make before the Committee (and its co-reporters) began the intensive labor of
drafting statutory language.
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C. WHAT DOES THE NEW ACT LOOK LIKE?
Re-ULLCA’s architecture derives from and resembles that of RUPA, ULLCA, and
ULPA (2001).
Article 1

contains

Article 2

provides

Article 3

governs

Article 4

states

Article 5

implements

Article 6

states

Article 7

delineates

Article 8
Article 9

governs
provides

Article 10

governs

Article 11

contains

general provisions, including definitions; sections on a limited liability company’s duration, purposes, powers, name, and agent for
service of process; and three key provisions
concerning the operating agreement
for the formation of limited liability companies and for the public filing of records pertaining to an LLC
the relations of members and managers to
third parties—i.e. with non-members dealing with or affected by the limited liability
company
the default rules for the members’ relationship inter se and with the limited liability
company and provides templates for member-management and manager-management
the “pick your partner” principle, which is at
the core of the law of unincorporated business organizations, and delimits the rights of
transferees
the causes and consequences of a person’s
dissociation as a member of a limited liability
company
the causes and consequences of the dissolution of a limited liability company
foreign limited liability companies
for direct and derivative claims by members
and for the establishment, conduct, and judicial review of special litigation committees
organic transactions—mergers, conversions,
and domestications
miscellaneous provisions, including a section
providing transition rules for pre-existing
limited liability companies

The only significant nomenclature change from ULLCA is the use of “certificate of organization” rather than “articles of organization” to refer to the publicly
filed document used to create a limited liability company. The change is intended
“to signal that: (i) the certificate merely reflects the existence of an LLC (rather
than being the locus for important governance rules); and (ii) this document is
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significantly different from articles of incorporation, which have a substantially
greater power to affect inter se rules for the corporate entity and its owners.”24

III. MAJOR INNOVATIONS IN THE NEW ACT
The new Act’s major innovations concern:
a. the operating agreement;
b. the “un-cabining” of fiduciary duty;
c. the obligation of good faith and fair dealing;
d. an owner’s legitimate self-interest;
e. a reformulation of the duty of care;
f. the “shelf LLC” issue;
g. the question of “statutory apparent authority”;
h. statements of authority by position;
i. default rules on management structure;
j. charging orders;
k. a remedy for oppressive conduct;
l. derivative claims and special litigation committees; and
m. organic transactions—mergers, conversions, and domestications.
Also noteworthy are (i) the Act’s eschewal of the notion of a “series LLC,” and
(ii) the situation faced under the Act by transferees.

A. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
The new Act defines the operating agreement very broadly: “ ‘Operating agreement’ means the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all
the members of a limited liability company, including a sole member, concerning the matters described in Section 110(a).”25 Following the modern statutory
trend26 (although not the axioms of contract law),27 this definition encompasses
an “agreement” of the sole member of a single member LLC. Following partnership law, the definition extends to the most informal of agreements.28
The operating agreement is an LLC’s foundational accord,29 even though formation of an LLC requires the filing of a document with a specified public official.30
24. Re-ULLCA § 102(1) cmt. (emphasis in original). Most LLC statutes use the term “articles of
organization.” See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.402 (West
Supp. 2007); see generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, at ¶ 5.05. Delaware uses the term
“certificate of formation.” DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2007).
25. Re-ULLCA § 102(13).
26. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 5.06 [3] [d].
27. As a matter of common law, a contract presupposes at least two parties. RICHARD A. LORD, 1
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2 (4th ed. 2006).
28. See RUPA § 101(7) (defining “partnership agreement”) and ULPA (2001) § 102 (13) (same).
Compare Revised Model Business Corporations Act § 7.32(b)(1) (2005) (requiring shareholder agreements to be in writing).
29. See the discussion infra at notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
30. Re-ULLCA § 201.
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The operating agreement’s domain is very broad,31 and the agreement is the first
place to look for the “deal” among the members.32
It is not required for an LLC to have an operating agreement,33 but it is inevitable:
[T]he Act’s very broad definition of “operating agreement” means that, as soon as
a limited liability company has any members, the limited liability company has an
operating agreement. For example, suppose: (i) two persons orally and informally
agree to join their activities in some way through the mechanism of an LLC, (ii) they
form the LLC or cause it to be formed, and (iii) without further ado or agreement,
they become the LLC’s initial members. The LLC has an operating agreement; “all
the members” have agreed on who the members are, and that agreement—no matter
how informal or rudimentary—is an agreement “concerning the matters described in
Section 110(a).”34

Continuing the tradition of RUPA, ULLCA, and ULPA (2001), the new Act
centralizes all provisions dealing with the power and effect of the operating agreement.35 “However, because an operating agreement raises issues too numerous
and complex to include easily in a single section, the new Act uses three related
sections to address the operating agreement.”36 Section 110 delineates the scope
and general power of operating agreement and states an important and specific
set of limitations on that power. Sections 111 and 112 deal with operating agreement mechanics and with the effect of the operating agreement on specified third
persons and on the LLC itself.
Recognizing that “[o]ne of the most complex questions in the law of unincorporated business organizations is the extent to which an agreement among the
organization’s owners can affect the law of fiduciary duty,”37 Section 110 considers
in detail the extent to which the operating agreement can define, alter, or eliminate aspects of fiduciary duty; expressly authorizes the operating agreement to
relieve members and managers from liability for money damages arising from
breach of duty (subject to specified limitations), and provides specific guidance
for courts asked to invalidate an operating agreement provision on the grounds

31. According to Re-ULLCA § 110(a):
The operating agreement governs: (1) relations among the members as members and between the
members and the limited liability company; (2) the rights and duties under this [act] of a person
in the capacity of manager; (3) the activities of the company and the conduct of those activities;
and (4) the means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.
32. “To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter described in subsection
(a), this [act] governs the matter.” Re-ULLCA § 110(b) (emphasis added).
33. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050(a) (West 2006) which provides: “In order to form a limited
liability company, one or more persons shall execute and file articles of organization with, and on a
form prescribed by, the Secretary of State and, either before or after the filing of articles of organization,
the members shall have entered into an operating agreement.” Id.
34. Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt.
35. Of course, under RUPA and ULPA (2001), the owners’ foundational document is called the partnership agreement rather than the operating agreement. See RUPA § 103(a); ULPA (2001) § 110(a).
36. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
37. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
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that the provision is “manifestly unreasonable.”38 These provisions are especially
important, given the Drafting Committee’s decision to “un-cabin” fiduciary duty.

B. “UN-CABINING” FIDUCIARY DUTY
For almost a century, Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon has been
the touchstone of the law of fiduciary duty among “[j]oint adventurers [and] copartners,”39 and before RUPA, fiduciary duty in unincorporated business organizations was mostly a matter of case law.40 According to the Comments to RUPA,
“the UPA . . . touches only sparingly on a partner’s duty of loyalty and leaves any
further development of the fiduciary duties of partners to the common law of
agency.”41
RUPA took a radically different approach and sought to codify exhaustively all
fiduciary duties relevant to a RUPA partnership and its partners.42 The underlying
idea was to “cabin in” fiduciary duty so as to protect partnership agreements from
judicial second-guessing.43

38. See the discussion infra at notes 39–52 and accompanying text (Section IV- B).
39. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
40. Re-ULLCA § 409(a) and (b) cmt. (stating that “[u]ntil the promulgation of RUPA, it was almost
axiomatic that . . . fiduciary duties reflect judge-made law”).
41. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1. The reference to the common law of agency was perhaps too narrow.
Partnership law had (and has) its own case law of fiduciary duty. E.g., Peskin v. Deutsch, 479 N.E.2d
1034, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“the fiduciary duty owed by one partner to another includes a duty
to make full and fair disclosure”); Klotz v. Klotz, 117 S.E.2d 650, 656 (Va. 1961) (“[t]he relationship
of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and
integrity in their dealings with one another in the partnership affairs”). Cases discussing the duty of
loyalty often sound in equity. E.g., Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. 817 A.2d
160, 175 (Del. 2002) (stating, “breach of the duty of loyalty . . . permits broad, discretionary, and equitable remedies”); Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar.
13, 2000) (holding breach of duty of loyalty did not permit an injunction in this case but did result
in “other equitable relief”).
42. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1 (“Section 404 is both comprehensive and exclusive.”). RUPA § 404(a)
provides that “The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).” (emphasis added). Those
subsections characterize a partner’s duty of loyalty (subsection (b)) and care (subsection (c)) as “limited
to” the obligations stated therein. (emphasis added).
43. See William J. Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 109, 115
(1997) (“RUPA attempts to displace common law rules that coexisted with the UPA, including common law fiduciary duty rules.”); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 451 (1997) (“In [Section
404] [RUPA] constricts the ability of courts to expand the concept of fiduciary duties. [T]he evident
purpose of this constriction is to increase the certainty and reliability of partnership agreements. . . .”).
See also Transcript of 2006 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, Saturday Morning Session, July 8, 2006, at 44
(on file with The Business Lawyer) (remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “Just for those people who
may not be in touch with the lingo, when we are talking about cabining in, that was RUPA’s contribution to say it was going to codify all those fiduciary duties, and that is what we have undone here.”);
Re-ULLCA § 409(a) and (b), cmt. (“In an effort to respect freedom of contract, bolster predictability,
and protect partnership agreements from second-guessing, the Conference decided that RUPA should
fence or “cabin in” all fiduciary duties within a statutory formulation.”).
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Both ULLCA and ULPA (2001) followed RUPA,44 but from the outset ReULLCA’s Drafting Committee was skeptical of this “cabin in” approach.45
Eventually, the Committee and the Conference decided that, at least in the
realm of limited liability companies, progress may be retrograde and “the
‘cabin in’ approach creates more problems than it solves.”46 The “cabin in”
approach ignores the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of members to
avoid oppressing fellow members,47 produces great difficulty in dealing with
member-to-member disclosure obligations in member-to-member buy-sell
transactions,48 and puts inordinate pressure on the concept of “good faith and
fair dealing.”49
As explained in the new Act’s Prefatory Note:
the better way to protect the operating agreement from judicial second-guessing
is to:
* increase and clarify the power of the operating agreement to define or re-shape
fiduciary duties (including the power to eliminate aspects of fiduciary duties); and
* provide some guidance to courts when a person seeks to escape an agreement
by claiming its provisions are “manifestly unreasonable.”50

44. ULPA (2001), § 408 (“[t]he only fiduciary duties that a general partner has to the limited partnership and the other partners are the duties of loyalty and care . . . . A general partner’s duty of loyalty
to the limited partnership and the other partners is limited to. . . . A general partner’s duty of care to
the limited partnership and the other partners . . . is limited to. . . .”) and ULLCA § 409 (“[t]he only
fiduciary duties a member owes . . . are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . . A member’s duty of
loyalty . . . is limited to. . . . A member’s duty of care . . . is limited to. . . .”).
45. Revision of Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Preliminary Report, 2003 NCCUSL
Annual Meeting, August, 2003, at 9, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/ann-meetdraft03.pdf.
46. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act. See also Transcript of the
2006 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 5 (remarks of Chairman David Walker “We have,
we say, ‘uncabined’ fiduciary duty.”).
47. See infra notes 111–32 and accompanying text (Part III-K).
48. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 636–39 (2004) [hereinafter “User’s Guide”] (explaining the difficulty of relying
on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, because that obligation must be tied to some duty or
right under the statute or the partnership agreement). See also Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting,
supra note 43, at 44 (Remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “Tremendous difficulty [exists if we try]
to deal with disclosure duties inter se members by statute. We tried it several times, Carter [Bishop,
co-reporter] and I. Every time we wrote something, the committee looked at it and said, you’re writing
a miniature securities act here. We don’t want it. So, the fiduciary duty of disclosure is an important
aspect of this.”).
49. User’s Guide, supra note 48. See also Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at
44 (Remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “[W]e are already seeing pressure in the courts on the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. When you say there are no other fiduciary duties and courts for
hundreds of years have looked to fiduciary duties as a policing mechanism that they can develop, if
you say you can’t have fiduciary duties, they will go to good faith. And, in fact, I had a conversation
with . . . [t]he judge of North Carolina’s business court [who] said, if you stop us on fiduciary duty,
we will just go to good faith.”). For further discussion of pressure on the duty of good faith, in an
analogous context, see Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability In Business
Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2006).
50. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
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As further explained by the chair of the Drafting Committee:
T]he efforts of the [drafting] committee [to uncabin fiduciary duty] resulted in further
articulation, clarification, elaboration, expansion of the freedom under Section 110
[powers of the operating agreement] to define the standards by which performance
was to be measured. Particularly, [ABA] advisors . . . were concerned that the operating agreement be permitted to define the standards of performance. So the net
effect . . . is to give further impetus to the members to define their obligations through
the contract.51

Accordingly, Section 409 of the new Act partially codifies the duties of loyalty
and care:
(a) A member of a member-managed limited liability company owes to the company and, subject to Section 901(b), the other members the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care stated in subsections (b) and (c).
(b) The duty of loyalty of a member in a member-managed limited liability company includes the duties:
(1) to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or
benefit derived by the member:
(A) in the conduct or winding up of the company’s activities;
(B) from a use by the member of the company’s property; or
(C) from the appropriation of a limited liability company opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of
the company’s activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the
company; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the company’s
activities before the dissolution of the company.
(c) Subject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member of
a member-managed limited liability company in the conduct and winding up of
the company’s activities is to act with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the company. In discharging this duty,
a member may rely in good faith upon opinions, reports, statements, or other information provided by another person that the member reasonably believes is a
competent and reliable source for the information.
....
(g) In a manager-managed limited liability company, the following rules apply:
(1) Subsections (a), (b), [and] (c), . . . apply to the manager or managers and not
the members.52

C. RETURNING GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING TO THE CONCEPT’S
CONTRACT LAW MOORINGS
Consistent with the new Act’s focus on the operating agreement, Section 409
returns the “the obligation of good faith and fair dealing” to that concept’s contract
law moorings.
51. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 44 (Remarks of Chairman Walker).
52. Re-ULLCA § 409(a), (b), (c), and (g) (emphasis added). Note the absence of “only” and
“limited to.”
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It was RUPA that first codified the obligation as part of a business entity
statute,53 but that codification did not mention the obligation’s contract law nature. RUPA § 404(d) states simply: “A partner shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing.” RUPA’s Comments, while recognizing the concept’s contract
law origin,54 took a very broad, open-ended view of the obligation:
The meaning of “good faith and fair dealing” is not firmly fixed under present law.
“Good faith” clearly suggests a subjective element, while “fair dealing” implies an objective component. It was decided to leave the terms undefined in the Act and allow
the courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases.55

ULLCA and ULPA (2001) each adopted the RUPA formulation essentially verbatim,56 but the new Act does not. Instead, Section 409(d) includes the word
“contractual” to modify the “obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”57
The difference is intended to signal a more conservative view of the obligation—
i.e., “to emphasize that the obligation is not an invitation to re-write agreements
among the members.”58 As the Comment to Section 409(d) explains:
[T]he obligation should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated
when the arrangements were made . . . . In sum, the purpose of the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing is to protect the arrangement the partners have chosen for themselves, not to restructure that arrangement under the guise of safeguarding it.59

D. THE QUESTION OF AN OWNER’S LEGITIMATE SELF-INTEREST
The new Act also differs from RUPA on how to approach the “schizoid” nature
of owner-to-owner relations in a closely held business.60 Despite Cardozo’s admonition in Meinhard that “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of

53. The obligation is implied by the common law (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981)) and had been previously codified in, inter alia, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.
§§ 1-304 (2001), 2-103(j) (2003)).
54. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4 notes: “The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a contract concept,
imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership.”
55. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
56. ULLCA § 409(d) and ULPA (2001) § 408(d). However, ULPA’ s Comments took a decidedly
narrower view of the obligation, stating: “Courts should not use the obligation to change ex post facto
the parties’ or this Act’s allocation of risk and power. To the contrary, in light of the nature of a limited
partnership, the obligation should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct
that is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated when the arrangements
were made.” ULPA (2001) § 305(b) cmt.
57. Re-ULLCA § 409(d) states: “A member in a member-managed limited liability company or a
manager-managed limited liability company shall discharge the duties under this [act] or under the
operating agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith
and fair dealing.” (Emphasis added).
58. Id. § 409(d) cmt.
59. Id. (quoting ULPA (2001), § 305(b) cmt.).
60. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 199 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2002)
(“UPA’s schizoid approach”).
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the market place,”61 owners of a closely held business have “certain rights to what
has been termed ‘selfish ownership. . . .’ ”62
RUPA tried to express this concept by stating: “[a] partner does not violate a
duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely
because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.”63 ULLCA and
ULPA (2001) each incorporate this language,64 but the new Act does not. As explained in the Comments to Re-ULLCA, Section 409: “This language is inappropriate in the complex and variegated world of LLCs. As a proposition of contract
law, the language is axiomatic and therefore unnecessary. In the context of fiduciary duty, the language is at best incomplete, at worst wrong, and in any event
confusing.”65
There is no simple, concise way to explicate the “schizoid” fiduciary duty of an
LLC member. Part III-K of this Article does, however, explain how this Act approaches member-to-member fiduciary duty.66

E. REFORMULATING THE DUTY OF CARE
The UPA states no standard of care, and RUPA sets a low standard: “[a] partner’s
duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding
up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of
law.”67 ULLCA and ULPA (2001) both copy RUPA.68
After much debate, the Drafting Committee and the Conference decided that,
in a post-Enron era, gross negligence sets the bar too low.69 The Committee and

61. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
62. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
63. RUPA § 404(e).
64. ULPA (2001) § 408(e) and ULLCA § 409(e).
65. Re-ULLCA § 409(e), cmt. In place of the omitted language, subsection 409(e) makes an important point about the duty of loyalty: “It is a defense to a claim under subsection (b)(2) [conflict
of interest; adverse dealings] and any comparable claim in equity or at common law that the transaction was fair to the limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 409(e). Although the subsection states “a
well-established principle of judge-made law,” the statement is useful: “Given this Act’s very detailed
treatment of fiduciary duties and especially the Act’s very detailed treatment of the power of the operating agreement to modify fiduciary duties, the statement is important because its absence might be
confusing.” Re-ULLCA § 409(e) cmt.
66. See infra at notes 111–32 and accompanying text.
67. RUPA § 404(c).
68. ULPA (2001) § 408(c) and ULLCA § 409(c).
69. The 2006 Annual Meeting Draft contains the following history of the Drafting Committee’s
discussions of this issue:
This section’s history was conceptually tumultuous. For some time, the uncertainty pertained
to the appropriate standard for the duty of care. At its November, 2003 meeting, at the urging
of Commissioner Blackburn, the Drafting Committee decided to try to (i) eschew the “gross
negligence” standard of care first promulgated in RUPA and afterwards followed in ULLCA
and ULPA (2001); and (ii) incorporate something like the standard of care/standard of liability
dichotomy recently adopted in MBCA §§ 8.30 and 8.31. Under the MBCA, that dichotomy exists
principally for directors and not for officers, cf. MBCA 8.42(c) (stating that director standard of
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Conference were also influenced by the fact that many LLC statutes state an ordinary care standard.70
The new Act’s standard is a hybrid—ordinary care expressly subject to the business judgment rule:
(c) Subject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member of a membermanaged limited liability company in the conduct and winding up of the company’s
activities is to act with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the member reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the company.
....
(g) In a manager-managed limited liability company, . . . [subsection] (c). . .appl[ies]
to the manager or managers and not the members.71

A detailed Comment explains the rationale:
In some circumstances, an unadorned standard of ordinary care is appropriate for
those in charge of a business organization or similar, non-business enterprise. In

liability principles apply to officers if they “have relevance), and those positions reflect categorically different kinds of responsibilities.
In response, the co-reporters drafted and the Committee considered a version of this section and a companion section, Section 410, that together attempted to parallel functionally the
MBCA’s positional distinction by using the defined terms “governance responsibility” and “operational responsibilities.” (The draft also differed from the MBCA approach by leaving unaffected
the traditional rules for duty of loyalty violations.)
At its April 2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee discussed the proposal at length and with
good-natured intensity. When the dust cleared, no one had moved to change any language. However, there was considerable sentiment expressed in favor of collapsing the two sections into one
provision and somehow reinstating the gross negligence standard in combination with a business
judgment rule formulation.
The chair of the Committee then directed the co-reporters to draft a single section, which
was presented to and adopted by the Committee during a teleconference. That single section
was distributed to the 2004 Annual Meeting as a supplement to the Act and was read in place of
the Sections 409 and 410 included in the Annual Meeting draft. At its October, 2004 meeting,
the Drafting Committee again vigorously debated the topic of fiduciary duty, but no changes
were moved.
....
At its February, 2006 meeting, the Committee returned again to the vexing question of the
appropriate standard of care and reached a compromise—maintaining an ordinary negligence
standard but expressly superimposing the business judgment rule.
2006 Annual Meeting Draft § 409 cmt. At the 2006 Annual Meeting, the Conference considered and
defeated a motion from the floor to return to the gross negligence standard. Transcript of 2006 Annual
Meeting, supra note 43, at 47–51.
70. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom With the Need For Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV 1609, 1658 (2004)
(article has two tables in the appendix summarizing state LLC statutes standard of care: 21 states with
“good faith prudent person” language and 19 states using “gross negligence or willful misconduct” language); Elizabeth S. Miller and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions:
The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 366–68
(2005) (“Approximately eighteen state LLC statutes parallel language formerly used in the MBCA and
require managers and managing members to act in good faith and exercise the care of an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances.”).
71. Re-ULLCA § 409(c) and (g)(1).

07_Kleinberger.indd 527

5/27/2007 9:55:42 AM

528

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 62, February 2007

others, the proper application of the duty of care must take into account the difficulties inherent in establishing an enterprise’s most fundamental policies, supervising
the enterprise’s overall activities, or making complex business judgments. Corporate
law subdivides circumstances somewhat according to the formal role exercised by the
person whose conduct is later challenged (e.g., distinguishing the duties of directors
from the duties of officers). LLC law cannot follow that approach, because a hallmark
of the LLC entity is its structural flexibility.
This subsection, therefore, seeks “the best of both worlds”—stating a standard
of ordinary care but subjecting that standard to the business judgment rule to the
extent circumstances warrant. The content and force of the business judgment rule
vary across jurisdictions, and therefore the meaning of this subsection may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
That result is intended. In any jurisdiction, the business judgment rule’s application will vary depending on the nature of the challenged conduct. There is, for example, very little (if any) judgment involved when a person with managerial power
acts (or fails to act) on an essentially ministerial matter. Moreover, under the law of
many jurisdictions, the business judgment rule applies similarly across the range of
business organizations. That is, the doctrine is sufficiently broad and conceptual so
that the formality of organizational choice is less important in shaping the application
of the rule than are the nature of the challenged conduct and the responsibilities and
authority of the person whose conduct is being challenged.
This Act seeks therefore to invoke rather than unsettle whatever may be each jurisdiction’s approach to the business judgment rule.72

F. THE QUESTION OF THE “SHELF LLC”
In practice, many attorneys (and their clients) wish to have a limited liability
company formed and on the public record while the relevant deal coalesces—
i.e., before the precise identity and relationship of the members has been finally
determined. In theory, according to some advisors to the Drafting Committee, a
member-less LLC is an oxymoron and having an LLC waiting “on the shelf” for
the members to be identified is an example of the “corpufuscation” of partnership law.73
“No issue roiled the drafting process to this Act more than the question of ‘shelf
LLCs,’ ”74 and a compromise was reached at the Drafting Committee’s final meeting

72. Re-ULLCA § 409(c) cmt. The new Act also approaches this subject from the other direction—
i.e., by expressly authorizing the operating agreement to exculpate a member or manager from liability
for breach of the duty of care. Re-ULLCA § 110(g). See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
73. Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 827, 872–73 (2005) [hereinafter “Prism”] and Progress Report, supra note 12, at 11
(2006). Other “theorists” point out that the LLC departed from its partnership moorings when LLC
statutes recognized the single member LLC. Id.
74. Re-ULLCA, 2006 Annual Meeting Draft, § 401 cmt. The Comment to the final statutory text
has a less dramatic tone: “No topic received more attention or generated more debate in the drafting
process for this Act than the question of the ‘shelf LLC’—i.e., an LLC formed without having at least one
member upon formation. Reasonable minds differed (occasionally intensely) as to whether the ‘shelf’
approach (i) is necessary to accommodate current business practices; and (ii) somehow does conceptual
violence to the partnership antecedents of the limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 201 cmt.
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(during the 2006 annual meeting).75 Most LLCs will be formed with at least one
person becoming a member upon formation,76 but the new Act “permits an organizer to file a certificate of organization without a person ‘waiting in the wings.’ ”77
For the latter situation, the Act requires two filings to form the LLC. The organizer must first deliver the certificate of organization for filing,78 and, “if the
company will have no members when the [Secretary of State] files the certificate,
[the certificate must contain] a statement to that effect.”79
The first filing is a just a precursor. Section 201 “provides that the LLC is not
formed until and unless at least one person becomes a member and the organizer
makes a second filing stating that the LLC has at least one member.”80 The second
filing must state “the date on which a person or persons became the company’s
initial member or members.”81
The Act suggests a deadline of 90 days for the second filing.82 If the deadline is
not met, the original filing “lapses and is void.”83 If the deadline is met, the limited
liability company is “deemed formed as of the date of initial membership stated”
in the required second filing.84
75. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 23 (Remarks of Chairman Walker stating
that the committee’s amendment to the annual meeting draft “does reveal a compromise”).
76. Re-ULLCA § 201(b)(3) and (d)(1) (providing that, unless the certificate of organization states
that “the company will have no members when the [Secretary of State] files the certificate,” a “limited
liability company is formed when the [Secretary of State] has filed the certificate of organization and
the company has at least one member, unless the certificate states a delayed effective date”).
77. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act. Re-ULLCA § 201(b)(3).
78. Re-ULLCA § 201(a).
79. Id. § 201(b)(3).
80. Id. Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
81. Id. § 201(e)(1)(B).
82. Id. § 201(e)(1) (placing the number 90 within brackets). See NCCUSL Drafting Rule 406, cmt.
(characterizing bracketed material as suggested).
83. Re-ULLCA § 201(e)(1).
84. Re-ULLCA § 201(e)(2). As a practical matter, the complexity inherent in the Act’s compromise
will be of greatest interest to lawyers asked to provide third party opinion letters. A detailed treatment
of that subject is beyond the scope of this article, but the following summary may be helpful.
(1) The principal purpose of a third party opinion letter is to indicate that a business organization
has the legal capacity to bind itself to a particular, significant transaction.
(2) To have that capacity, the organization must, of course, exist as a legal entity. In this connection, third party opinion letters traditionally consider both whether a business organization was “duly
formed” and is “validly existing.”
(3) Under Re-ULLCA, due formation involves the limited liability company having at least one
member upon formation—either: (i) when the filing officer files the certificate of organization, ReULLCA § 201(d)(1), or (ii) when, subsequent to that filing, the organizer admits a person as an initial
member, delivers to the filing officer a statement so indicating, and the filing officer files the statement.
Re-ULLCA §§ 201(e)(2) and 401(c).
(4) The filing officer’s act of filing the certificate under § 201(d)(1) or the statement under
§ 201(e)(2) is, as a statutory matter, “conclusive proof that the organizer satisfied all conditions to the
formation of a limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 201(d)(3) and (e)(3).
(5) As for the opinion letter concept of “validly existing,” it may be appropriate to ascertain that at
the moment of formation the limited liability company did indeed have at least one member.
For a more detailed discussion of opinion issues concerning limited liability companies, see Robert R. Keatinge, Shelf LLCs and Opinion Letter Issues: Exegesis and Eisegesis of LLC Statutes, Vol. XXIII,
No. 2, PUBOGRAM 15 (March 2006). See also TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party Closing Opinions: Limited Liability Companies, 61 BUS. LAW. 679 (2006).
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G. STATUTORY APPARENT AUTHORITY
The power of a member or manager of a business organization to bind the organization to third parties is in essence a question of agency law, and in this context
one of the most important rules of agency law is apparent authority by position.85
Most LLC statutes codify this concept, providing “what might be termed ‘statutory
apparent authority’ for members in a member-managed limited liability company
and managers in a manager-managed limited liability company.”86
This approach traces back to the original Uniform Partnership Act87 and has
been copied by RUPA, ULLCA, ULPA (2001)88 and myriad state LLC statutes.89
Nevertheless, the Drafting Committee determined that statutory apparent authority is inappropriate for limited liability companies, because:
• codifying power to bind according to position makes sense only for organizations that have well-defined, well-known, and almost paradigmatic
management structures; and
• limited liability companies feature almost infinite flexibility of management structure and an LLC’s name provides no clue as to the LLC’s management structure.
As explained in a March 2006 “Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act”:
The concept [of statutory apparent authority] still makes sense both for general and
limited partnerships. A third party dealing with either type of partnership can know
by the formal name of the entity and by a person’s status as general or limited partner
whether the person has the power to bind the entity.

85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006) [hereinafter “R.3d Agency”] (“This Restatement . . . discusses at length the application of agency doctrine to organizations. Many agents hold positions in organizations. This Restatement thus covers applications of agency doctrine to persons who act
as representatives of corporations, partnerships, other business organizations, and private not-for-profit
entities. In that context, the focal point for the application of agency doctrine is determining either the
duties owed the organization by those holding positions within it or the consequences of interactions
between actors in positions defined by one organization with individuals external to the organization
or with actors who hold positions in another organization.”); id. § 1.03 cmt. b (“If the principal places
a person in a position or office with specific functions or responsibilities, from which third parties will
infer that the principal assents to acts by the person requisite to fulfilling the specific functions or responsibilities, the principal has manifested such assent to third parties.”); id. § 3.03 cmt. b (“A principal
may also make a manifestation by placing an agent in a defined position in an organization . . . . Third
parties who interact with the principal through the agent will naturally and reasonably assume that the
agent has authority to do acts consistent with the agent’s position . . . unless they have notice of facts
suggesting that this may not be so.”); id. § 3.03 cmt. c (“Apparent authority in an organizational setting
may also arise from the fact that a person occupies a type of position that customarily carries specific
authority although the organization has withheld such authority from that agent.”).
86. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) cmt.
87. Uniform Partnership Act § 9(1) (1914) [hereinafter “UPA”] (providing) that “the act of every
partner . . . for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership . . . binds the
partnership”).
88. RUPA § 301; ULLCA § 301; ULPA (2001) § 402.
89. For a discussion of this approach in LLC statutes, see BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19,
¶ 7.05 [3].
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Most LLC statues have attempted to use the same approach but with a fundamentally important (and problematic) distinction. An LLC’s status as member-managed
or manager-managed determines whether members or managers have the statutory
power to bind. But an LLC’s status as member- or manager-managed is not apparent
from the LLC’s name. A third party must check the public record, which may reveal
that the LLC is manager-managed, which in turn means a member as member has no
power to bind the LLC. As a result, a provision that originated in 1914 as a protection for third parties can, in the LLC context, easily function as a trap for the unwary.
The problem is exacerbated by the almost infinite variety of management structures
permissible in and used by LLCs.90

Thus, “it makes no sense to require each LLC to publicly select between two
statutorily preordained structures (i.e., manager-managed/member-managed)
and . . . link a ‘statutory power to bind’ to each of those two structures.”91 Accordingly, Section 301 of the new Act states simply that: “A member is not
an agent of a limited liability company solely by reason of being a member. A
person’s status as a member does not prevent or restrict law other than this [act]
from imposing liability on a limited liability company because of the person’s
conduct.”92
Under the new Act, the question of a member or manager’s power to bind
becomes a matter of agency law:
[Section 301] expressly preserves the power of other law to hold an LLC directly or
vicariously liable on account of conduct by a person who happens to be a member.
For example, given the proper set of circumstances: (i) a member might have actual
or apparent authority to bind an LLC to a contract; (ii) the doctrine of respondeat
superior might make an LLC liable for the tortuous conduct of a member (i.e., in
some circumstances a member acts as a “servant” of the LLC); and (iii) an LLC might
be liable for negligently supervising a member who is acting on behalf of the LLC. A
person’s status as a member does not weigh against any of these or any other relevant
theories of law.
Moreover, subsection (a) does not prevent member status from being relevant to
one or more elements of an “other law” theory. The most categorical example concerns the authority of a non-manager member of a manager-managed LLC.
EXAMPLE: A vendor knows that an LLC is manager-managed but chooses to
accept the signature of a person whom the vendor knows is merely a member of the
LLC. Assuring the vendor that the LLC will stand by the member’s commitment, the
member states, “It’s such a simple matter; no one will mind.” The member genuinely
believes the statement, and the vendor accepts the assurance.

90. Progress Report, supra note 12, at 10 (emphasis in original).
91. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) cmt. See also R.3d Agency, supra note 85, §3.03 cmt. c (“Moreover, the
fact that any given organization has a particular legal form does not mean that its actual operational
practices conform perfectly to legal form. Organizations vary widely in the degree to which they
operate informally or formally in making decisions and in interacting with third parties external to
the organization. Organizations also vary in the degree to which authority is associated solely with
a position within an organizational hierarchy or is personalized to a particular individual regardless
of the organization’s formal association of authority with defined positions.”).
92. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) and (b).

07_Kleinberger.indd 531

5/27/2007 9:55:43 AM

532

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 62, February 2007

The person’s status as a mere member will undermine a claim of apparent authority.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03, cmt. d (2006) (explaining the “reasonable belief”
element of a claim of apparent authority, and role played by context, custom, and the
supposed agent’s position in an organization). Likewise, the member will have no actual authority. Absent additional facts, section 407(c)(1) (vesting all management authority in the managers) renders the member’s belief unreasonable. Restatement (Third)
of Agency § 2.01, cmt. c (2006) (explaining the “reasonable belief” element of a claim
of actual authority).93

Although “under section 301(a), . . . the mere fact that a person is a member of
a member-managed limited liability company cannot by itself establish apparent
authority by position. . . . [a] course of dealing . . . may easily change the analysis.”94
Another example from the Comments illustrates this point:
EXAMPLE: David is a one of two members of DS, LLC, a member-managed LLC.
David orders paper clips on behalf of the LLC, signing the purchase agreement,
“David, as a member of DS, LLC.” The vendor accepts the order, sends an invoice
to the LLC’s address, and in due course receives a check drawn on the LLC’s bank
account. When David next places an order with the vendor, the LLC’s payment of the
first order is a manifestation that the vendor may use in establishing David’s apparent
authority to place the second order.95

The Comments to Sections 301 and 407 analyze in detail how agency law will
function in the absence of statutory apparent authority. The results will be acceptable even for pre-existing LLCs, formed under a statute that provided for statutory
apparent authority, because “the notion of ‘lingering apparent authority’ will protect any third party that has previously relied on the statutory apparent authority
of a member of a particular member-managed LLC or a manager of a particular
manager-managed LLC.”96

H. STATEMENTS OF AUTHORITY BY POSITION
Eliminating statutory apparent authority eliminates the need to have an LLC’s
certificate of organization indicate the LLC’s management structure. However, the
members of an LLC might want to make public their management structure in
order to facilitate transactions and to avoid “having to disclose to third parties the
entirety of the operating agreement.”97
The new Act addresses this issue by authorizing a statement of authority
pertaining to a position. RUPA pioneered the notion of a publicly-filed statement

93. Re-ULLCA § 301(b) cmt.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Re-ULLCA § 1104 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.11 cmt. c (2006)) (Application to
Existing Relationships), Legislative Note (stating that “[s]ection 301 (de-codifying statutory apparent
authority) does not require any special transition provisions”).
97. Re-ULLCA § 302(a)(2) cmt.
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of authority pertaining to particular partners,98 and Re-ULLCA takes that concept
a step further. Under Re-ULLCA, § 302(a)(2), a statement of authority:
with respect to any position that exists in or with respect to the company, may state
the authority, or limitations on the authority, of all persons holding the position to:
(A) execute an instrument transferring real property held in the name of the company; or
(B) enter into other transactions on behalf of, or otherwise act for or bind, the
company . . . .99

As with RUPA, statements of authority concerning real property can give constructive notice if properly filed in the real estate records, while other statements
of authority affect only third parties with knowledge. As explained by the Comment to Re-ULLCA Section 302:
This section is derived from and builds on RUPA, § 303, and, like that provision
is conceptually divided into two realms: statements pertaining to the power to
transfer interests in the LLC’s real property and statements pertaining to other matters. In the latter realm, statements are filed only in the records of the [Secretary of
State], operate only to the extent the statements are actually known. Section 302(d)
and (e).
As to interests in real property, in contrast, this section: (i) requires double-filing—
with the [Secretary of State] and in the appropriate land records; and (ii) provides
for constructive knowledge of statements limiting authority. Thus, a properly filed
and recorded statement can protect the limited liability company, Section 302(g),
and, in order for a statement pertaining to real property to be a sword in the hands
of a third party, the statement must have been both filed and properly recorded.
Section 302(f ).100

I. TEMPLATES FOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Most LLC statutes provide for default rules for two types of management
structure—member-management and manager-management.101 The new Act continues these templates but innovates in two significant ways.
First, the Act permits the operating agreement rather than the certificate of organization to establish an LLC’s management structure.102 This approach is made
possible by the Act’s eschewal of statutory apparent authority.

98. RUPA § 303.
99. Re-ULLCA § 302(a)(2). The section also permits statements of authority as to “a specific
person.” Id. § 302(a)(3).
100. Id. § 302 cmt.
101. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 7.02 [2] and [3].
102. Re-ULLCA § 407(a). If the operating agreement does not specify manager-management,
for purposes of the Act’s operative provision the LLC will be member-managed. That is, “membermanaged” is the default setting. Id. § 102(10) ( “ ‘Manager-managed limited liability company’ means
a limited liability company that qualifies under Section 407(a).”); id. §102(12) (“ ‘Member-managed
limited liability company’ means a limited liability company that is not a manager-managed limited
liability company.”).
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Second, the Act recognizes that the statutory templates are just that. Some
LLCs use neither of the templates for management structure, and many LLCs start
with one of the templates but (via the operating agreement) alter significantly the
allocation of power among the members or between members and managers. Accordingly, the Act carefully contemplates how managerial duties might shift to correspond with the particular management relationships chosen by the members.103

J. CHARGING ORDERS
The charging order is a venerable part of the law of unincorporated business
organizations104 and is an essential buttress to the “pick your partner” principle
that is central to the law of limited liability companies.105 The new Act reinforces
the principle by modernizing the statutory language on charging orders. The goal
is “that the language (and its protections against outside interference in an LLC’s
activities) can be readily understood.”106
The charging order is a lien in favor of the judgment creditor of a member or
transferee which applies against the transferable interest of the judgment debtor.
Once in effect and duly served on the limited liability company, a charging order
“requires the limited liability company to pay over to the person to which the
charging order was issued any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the
judgment debtor.”107
The order functions analogously to a garnishment, and the court has the power
to deal with efforts to evade the lien:
To the extent necessary to effectuate the collection of distributions pursuant to
a charging order, the court may:
(1) appoint a receiver of the distributions subject to the charging order, with the
power to make all inquiries the judgment debtor might have made; and
(2) make all other orders necessary to give effect to the charging order.108

The court’s power is limited to evasive conduct and does not extend to interfering in the legitimate activities of the LLC. A court enforcing a charging order
has no more right to affect the LLC’s obligations to the judgment debtor than the
court would have to compel a wage garnishee to increase the wages of the debtor
employee. Thus, a receiver appointed under Re-ULLCA, § 503(b) is emphatically

103. See, e.g., Re-ULLCA § 110(f) (“To the extent the operating agreement of a member-managed limited liability company expressly relieves a member of a responsibility that the member would otherwise
have under this [act] and imposes the responsibility on one or more other members, the operating
agreement may, to the benefit of the member that the operating agreement relieves of the responsibility,
also eliminate or limit any fiduciary duty that would have pertained to the responsibility.”).
104. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Carter G. Bishop, Thomas Earl Geu, Charging Orders and the New
Uniform Limited Partnership Act—Dispelling Rumors Of Disaster, 18 PROBATE AND PROPERTY 30, 30 (July/
August 2004).
105. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][a][iv].
106. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
107. Re-ULLCA § 503(a).
108. Id. § 503(b).
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not a receiver for the LLC; the receiver’s powers are limited solely to seeking information to which the judgment debtor is entitled.109
As for the court’s power “to make all other orders,” that power is limited to
those orders “necessary to give effect to the charging order.” The Comment to Section 503(b)(2) provides two very important examples:
Example: A judgment creditor with a charging order believes that the limited liability company should invest less of its surplus in operations, leaving more funds for
distributions. The creditor moves the court for an order directing the limited liability
company to restrict re-investment. Subsection (b)(2) does not authorize the court to
grant the motion.
Example: A judgment creditor with a judgment for $10,000 against a member obtains a charging order against the member’s transferable interest. Having been properly served with the order, the limited liability company nonetheless fails to comply
and makes a $3000 distribution to the member. The court has the power to order the
limited liability company to pay $3000 to the judgment creditor to “give effect to the
charging order.”110

K. A REMEDY FOR OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
In 2003, when the Drafting Committee first reported to a NCCUSL annual meeting, the question of a statute-based remedy for oppressive conduct was one of nine
major topics discussed in the Committee’s briefing memo.111 The memo acknowledged that, as of that moment, “[t]he Drafting Committee has had almost no discussion of this topic, other than to acknowledge that the topic is of great importance
and will require careful and repeated discussion.”112 The memo then described the
question before the Committee (and eventually the Conference) as follows:
LLCs may be destined eventually to supplant the corporation as the entity of choice
for closely held businesses. If so, omitting an oppression remedy from the new Act
(i) could be interpreted as rejecting the past five decades of legal developments regarding oppression, and (ii) would, at minimum, force courts to consider re-inventing
the corporate oppression wheel in the LLC context.
On the other hand, the limited liability company is essentially a contract-based
arrangement—at least inter se the members (which is relevant focal point for discussions of oppression). The contracting parties may protect themselves to the extent
they consider necessary. Moreover, the paucity of LLC statutes with oppression remedies might mean something about proper public policy and certainly has implications for the prospects of uniform enactment.

109. If the judgment debtor is a mere transferee, the entitlement is nil until dissolution. See id.
§ 502(a)(3)(B) and (c) (stating that a mere transferee is not entitled to “have access to records or other
information concerning the company’s activities . . . [except that] [i]n a dissolution and winding up of
a limited liability company, a transferee is entitled to an account of the company’s transactions only
from the date of dissolution”).
110. Id. § 503(b)(2) cmt.
111. 2003 NCCUSL Annual Meeting Briefing Memo, at 64–72, available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ullca/ann-meet-draft03.pdf.
112. Id. at 70.
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Yet close corporation law developed its protections for minority shareholders by
analogizing to general partnerships, which are at least as much creatures of contract
as are limited liability companies (and arguably more so; no public filing is necessary
to create a general partnership). Moreover, in most limited liability companies the
contractual arrangement is a “relational contract”—i.e., of long duration, with parts
of the bargain necessarily left open or subject to discretion, and with the parties to
the bargain significantly interdependent. Although the concept of relational contracts
has had little impact on the courts, the circumstances described by the concept have
occasioned legislative intervention at both federal and state levels. Statutes designed
to protect dealers provide the most notable examples. Whether such intervention
is good policy is a separate question, but the examples show that on occasion this
society chooses to have the government intervene “for the sake of fairness” in arrangements that are primarily contractual.113

By 2006, when the Conference gave final approval to the new Act, the inclusion
of a statute-based remedy was a non-issue; the decision to include a remedy went
without discussion, let alone debate.114
The new Act’s oppression remedy appears in the section concerning dissolution. Section 701(a)(5) authorizes a court to dissolve a limited liability company:
on application by a member, . . . on the grounds that the managers or those members
in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be
directly harmful to the applicant.115

Section 701(b) authorizes a court to “order a remedy other than dissolution.”116
The operating agreement cannot alter Section 701(a)(5) but may limit or even
eliminate subsection (b).117
Providing a remedy for oppression makes good sense. “Like most close corporations, most limited liability companies face the ‘lock in’ problem and the corresponding susceptibility of minority owners to oppression by those in control.”118
Moreover, “courts have begun to apply close corporation ‘oppression’ doctrine to
LLCs.”119

113. Id. at 71–72 (citations omitted).
114. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 62–64.
115. Re-ULLCA § 701(a)(5).
116. Id. § 701(b).
117. Id. § 110(c)(7) (stating that an operating agreement may not “vary the power of a court to
decree dissolution in the circumstances specified in Section 701(a). . . (5)). Section 110(c) does not
mention section 701(b). Therefore, the operating agreement has plenary power over that provision.
Id. § 110(a) (stating that (“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), the operating
agreement governs: (1) relations among the members as members and between the members and
the limited liability company; . . . [and] (3) the activities of the company and the conduct of those
activities”).
118. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 120 (2006) [hereinafter “Direct v. Derivative”]. See generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER,
supra note 19, ¶ 10.09.
119. Re-ULLCA, 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701, Reporters’ Notes, available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2005annmtgdraft.htm. See also Harvey Gelb, Fiduciary Duties and Dissolution in
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The Act’s approach to this question is nuanced, although the nuances are latent
and reflect a mixture of reliance on judicial good sense and deference to the members’ foresight (i.e., their operating agreement). The Drafting Committee selected
as the applicable term of art the word “oppressive” rather than the perhaps looser
phrase “unfairly prejudicial” but then chose not to specify in detail the factors to
be considered in determining whether conduct is “oppressive.”120 These choices
reflect respect for judicial good sense. Deference for the operating agreement
includes the members’ power under Section 110 to clearly delineate members’
discretionary authority. As is stated in the Comment to the section codifying the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing:
Courts should not use the obligation to change ex post facto the parties’ or this Act’s
allocation of risk and power. To the contrary, . . . the obligation should be used only
to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that is manifestly beyond what a
reasonable person could have contemplated when the arrangements were made. . . .
In sum, the purpose of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to protect the
arrangement the [members] have chosen for themselves, not to restructure that arrangement under the guise of safeguarding it.121

It is noteworthy that the oppression remedy is phrased initially as courtordered dissolution and that the operating agreement can limit the court to that
remedy. Dissolution is the “nuclear option” in any dispute among members of a
closely held business, and a separate provision of the Act authorizes a court to
fashion a less draconian remedy.122
the Closely Held Business, 3 WYO. L. REV. 547 (2003); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing
Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the
LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2004); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005); Pinnacle Data
Serv., Inc. v. Gillen, 104 S.W.3d 188, 196 (Tex. App. 2003) (expressly applying close corporation doctrine); Wyoming.com, LLC v. Lieberman, 109 P.3d 883, 886 (Wyo. 2005) (Kite, J., concurring) (“We have
not had the occasion to address Mr. Lieberman’s rights as a minority owner in the LLC nor the obligations
of the LLC to him as a minority interest owner. Those rights and responsibilities in the context of other
forms of business organizations are well developed and may provide guidance in the realm of the LLC.”).
120. See 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701(a)(5), Reporters’ Notes, which explain:
At its April, 2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee deleted language that would have cabined
somewhat the vague term “oppressive.” The deleted language provided that:
oppressive conduct has occurred only if the conduct complained of has directly harmed the applicant and:
(1) constitutes a material, uncured breach of the operating agreement or of the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing stated in Section 409(d); or
(2) although not constituting a material, uncured breach under paragraph (1), has substantially
defeated an expectation of the applicant which is entitled to protection because the expectation:
(A) is not contradicted by any term of the operating agreement nor by the reasonable implication
of any term of that agreement;
(B) was central to the applicant’s decision to become a member of the limited liability company
or for a substantial time has been centrally important in the member’s continuing membership;
(C) was known to other members, which expressly or impliedly acquiesced in it;
(D) is consistent with the reasonable expectations of all the members; and
(E) is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
121. Re-ULLCA § 409(d) cmt. (quoting the Comment to ULPA (2001), § 305(b); brackets and first
ellipsis added).
122. Re-ULLCA § 701(b).
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The Act includes the lesser remedy because: “In the close corporation context,
many courts have reached this position without express statutory authority, most
often with regard to court-ordered buyouts of oppressed shareholders. The Drafting Committee preferred to save courts and litigants the trouble of re-inventing
that wheel in the LLC context.”123 However, the members through their operating
agreement may override subsection (b), in effect limiting the court (and themselves) to the all-or-nothing remedy of dissolution.124
It is also noteworthy that the new Act does not directly address the question
of member-to-member fiduciary duties. The modern law of close corporations
makes clear that shareholders owe each other fiduciary duties,125 and some recent
LLC cases have ruled likewise as to members.126
The new Act takes a different approach. The Act’s partial codification of fiduciary duty of loyalty pertains only to duties that protect the entity,127 and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is purposefully referred to as “contractual” in
order to “emphasize that the obligation is not an invitation to re-write agreements
among the members.”128
There is space, however, for courts to find a fiduciary duty among members. The
codification in Section 409 is not exhaustive,129 and, indeed, Section 701(a)(5)(B)
123. Re-ULLCA, 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701(b), Reporters’ Notes.
124. Compare ULPA (2001), § 1206(c)(5) (providing that, for limited partnerships “dragged into”
the new limited partnership act, “Section 603(5) [authorizing a court to expel a general partner without dissolving the limited partnership] does not apply and a court has the same power to expel a general partner as the court had immediately before [the effective date of this [Act]]”) (first set of brackets
added). The pre-ULPA (2001) case law was divided as to whether—absent an authorizing provision
in the partnership agreement—a court had the power to expel a general partner without dissolving the limited partnership. See e.g., Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 807 F. Supp. 1025,1059–60
(S.D.N.Y 1992) (“[t]his Court has the power to remove . . . general partners of the Limited Partnerships
in issue and elevate a limited partner to the position of managing partner in order to preserve the
partnership . . . . ” ); Heikel v. 268 Ltd., No. 87-2464, 1989 WL 123632, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 1989),
(“to be legitimate, the expulsion must be ‘bona fide under the partnership agreement’” and regardless
of legitimate expulsion, the “ouster” from the partnership dissolved the limited partnership).
125. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) is
perhaps the seminal case, but other examples abound. See generally 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL AND ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATION & LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:27 (Rev. 3d ed.
2006); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith—The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held Corporations,
16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143 (1990); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability
Company: Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005).
126. Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (“Indiana
LLCs, being similar to Indiana partnerships and corporations impose a common law fiduciary duty
on their officers and members in the absence of contrary provisions in LLC operating agreements.”);
Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
21, 2003) (“[s]ince it is also well established as a fundamental rule of partnerships, that all partners,
not just the majority, owe each other fiduciary duties (Lightfoot v. Hardaway, 751 S.W.2d 844, 849
(Tenn.Ct.App.1988)), it logically follows that a majority of the members of an “LLC” should owe a
fiduciary duty to the minority members just like the duty a majority of the shareholders of an “Inc.”
owe the minority shareholders.”) (citations and emphasis in original).
127. Re-ULLCA § 409(b)(1)-(3) (“to account to the company . . . [for usurped company opportunities]; to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of the company’s
activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the company; and . . . to refrain from
competing with the company . . . . ”).
128. Id. § 409(d) and cmt.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 45–49.
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inescapably implies that “those members in control of the company” have a duty
to avoid acting “in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly
harmful” to another member.130
However, while articulating member-to-member fiduciary duty would put the
Act squarely within the modern law of closely held business,131 the question is
largely semantic. The oppression remedy exists, and conduct by “those members
in control of the company” will trigger it.132

L. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
The distinction between direct and derivative claims follows from the status of
a business organization as a legal person distinct from its owners.133 Following the
majority view in the case law of closely held businesses,134 the new Act requires
a member who brings a direct action to “plead and prove an actual or threatened
injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to be suffered
by the limited liability company.”135
The Act recognizes the direct/derivative distinction as an important safeguard
to the members’ agreed-upon arrangements.136 The Act’s provisions on derivative
claims are modern, based on the provisions of ULPA (2001), which improved on
the provisions of ULLCA, which in turn had improved on the provisions of the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976/1985).
The Act innovates by expressly providing for special litigation committees. As
explained by the Comment to Section 905:
Although special litigation committees are best known in the corporate field, they are
no more inherently corporate than derivative litigation or the notion that an organization is a person distinct from its owners. An “SLC” can serve as an ADR mechanism,

130. Re-ULLCA § 701(a)(5)(B).
131. See supra note 119.
132. Fiduciary duty is, in its origins, an equitable concept. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1493 (2002) (citing L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69–72). It has been stated that “[t]he maxim of the common law
that wherever there is a right there is a remedy for its infraction has never been adopted by courts of
equity.” Powers v. Bald Eagle Boom Co., 17 A. 254, 255 (Pa. 1889). But here the situation is opposite.
The Act creates the remedy and a right to pursue it. Articulating a duty correlative with the right may
be of conceptual interest, but as a practical matter the Act’s protection is sufficient as is.
133. See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 10.01 [2][b][i] for a general treatment of this
topic and Direct v. Derivative, supra note 118, for a detailed analysis.
134. Direct v. Derivative, supra note 118, at 118–19.
135. Re-ULLCA § 901(b). See also id. §§ 409(a) (formulating the duties of loyalty and care as
“owe[d] to the company and, subject to Section 901(b), the other members”), 701(a)(5)(B) (permitting
a member to seek dissolution on account of conduct that “was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant”) (emphasis added).
136. See e.g., Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 n.16 (S.D. 1997) (“Those who operate and
manage these [small, corporate] farms and businesses, often the majority shareholders, should not
be subject to the demands of minority shareholders whose concern may be solely that of dividends
and not the farm or business itself. Many of these small corporations and their management are illprepared to invest the time and money required to fend off a minority shareholder suit and are therefore influenced by the mere threat of such litigation.”).
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help protect an agreed upon arrangement from strike suits, protect the interests of
members who are neither plaintiffs nor defendants (if any), and bring to any judicial
decision the benefits of a specially tailored business judgment.137

The Act adopts the Auerbach approach to judicial review of SLC decisions.138
The SLC has the burden of proving “that the members of the committee were
disinterested and independent and that the committee acted in good faith, independently, and with reasonable care,”139 but—if the SLC meets this burden—the
court may not substitute its judgment for the SLC’s.140
To allow an SLC to do its work, and to blunt one of the weapons of a strike
suit, “on motion by the committee made in the name of the company . . . the court
shall stay discovery for the time reasonably necessary to permit the committee
to make its investigation.”141 However, the court may refuse or limit the stay “for
good cause shown” by the plaintiffs, and the SLC provision “does not prevent the
court from enforcing a person’s right to information under Section 410 [providing extensive information rights to members] or, for good cause shown, granting
extraordinary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction.”142

M. ORGANIC TRANSACTIONS—MERGERS, CONVERSIONS,
AND DOMESTICATIONS
Modern LLC statutes provide for a panoply of entity-transformative transactions, ranging from intra-species/intra-jurisdiction (i.e., a merger of domestic LLCs)
to cross-species/cross-jurisdiction (e.g. a domestic LLC converting into another type of organization under the law of a different jurisdiction).143 Article 10 of
the new Act provides for an LLC’s participation in the three generally recognized
“organic” transactions: mergers, conversions, and domestications.144
For Article 10 to apply, a domestic limited liability company must be involved
either as “input” or “output.” For example, Article 10 applies to a merger in which
a domestic LLC and two foreign LLCs merge into a foreign limited partnership
and also to a conversion in which a foreign limited partnership becomes a domestic LLC. The Act does not include interest exchanges (the unincorporated
analog to the corporate “share exchange”), because that type of transaction would

137. Re-ULLCA § 905 cmt.
138. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619 (N.Y. 1979).
139. Re-ULLCA § 905(e).
140. See id. § 905(d) cmt. (“The standard stated for judicial review of the SLC determination follows Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. 1979) rather than Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), because the latter’s reference to a court’s business judgment has
generally not been followed in other states.”) (citations in original).
141. Re-ULLCA § 905(a).
142. Id.
143. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶¶ 12.09, 12.11.
144. Re-ULLCA Article 10. The Re-ULLCA provisions are based closely on comparable provisions
in ULPA (2001), except that Re-ULLCA treats domestications and conversations as separate types of
transactions. ULPA (2001) treats domestications as a subset of conversions. Re-ULLCA § 1001 cmt.
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be novel in the unincorporated context and is far from universally accepted in
corporate law.145
The following matrix shows the range of possibilities under Article 10:

intra-species

intra-jurisdiction

inter-jurisdiction

• merger involving
only domestic LLCs

• merger involving both
domestic and foreign LLCs
but no other “species” of
entity
• domestication

inter-species

• merger involving a
domestic LLC and at
least one other domestic “species”
• conversion in which
a domestic LLC
becomes another
species of domestic
entity, or vice versa

• merger involving a domestic
LLC and at least one other
foreign “species” (and perhaps other domestic organizations as well)
• conversion in which a domestic LLC becomes another
species of foreign entity, or
vice versa

N. THE DECISION TO ESCHEW THE SERIES LLC
A series LLC “authorizes an extraordinary type of membership interest—one that
neither pertains to nor partakes of an entire LLC but rather is associated with and
segregated to a compartmentalized set of assets, profits, losses, and liabilities.”146
An LLC statute that authorizes series LLCs permits “an LLC to compartmentalize
its operations and create ‘internal’ shields to protect assets associated with one
aspect of the business from claims pertaining to others. Under [a series provision],
an LLC may associate specified assets and operations with a particular series of
membership interests and limit claims and obligations pertaining to those interests and operations to the specified assets.”147
States ranging from Delaware to Iowa have authorized series LLCs,148 and the
Drafting Committee considered following those states. Indeed, at its February,
145. For example, the Delaware corporate statute does not provide for share exchanges (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–66 (2007)), and neither does California (CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1100–1113 (West
Supp. 2006)). But see N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 913(a)(1) (McKinney 2003) (“[t]wo domestic corporations may, as provided in this section, participate in the consummation of a plan for binding share
exchanges”); id. §913(f)(1) (“[a] foreign corporation and a domestic corporation may participate in
a share exchange, but, if the subject corporation is a foreign corporation, only if such exchange is
permitted by the laws of the jurisdiction under which such foreign corporation is incorporated.”).
146. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 14.06[1][c].
147. Id. ¶ 6.01[5].
148. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2007) and IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.305 (West 1999). For an
example of an ULLCA-based statute that permits series, see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (West
Supp. 2006).
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2006 meeting, the Committee considered a series provision that would have significantly advanced the concept.149
Ultimately, however, the Drafting Committee declined to accept the series concept. A March 2006 “Progress Report” on the new Act contained the following
explanation for this decision:
Originally devised by sophisticated Delaware lawyers for their “funds” clients, series
are now being (mis)used to subdivide assets of operating businesses and to provide
unwarranted hopes of low cost “asset protection.” No one quite knows what will happen under bankruptcy law when a series becomes insolvent. Nor does anyone know
whether the courts of a non-series state will respect the “internal shields” of a series
LLC. Most LLC statutes provide that “foreign law governs” the liability of members
of a foreign LLC. However, those provisions are irrelevant [to a foreign series LLC]
because they pertain to the liability of a member for the obligations of the LLC. For a
series LLC, the pivotal question is entirely different—namely, whether some assets of
an LLC should be immune from some of the creditors of the LLC.
What’s good for Delaware and highly sophisticated deals is not necessarily good
for the LLC law of other states. A philosophy that works wonders for “high end”
transactions may be bad medicine for the thousands of more prosaic but nonetheless
important closely held businesses that choose to house themselves within LLCs.150

A recent posting to LNET-LLC (a list serve focusing on limited liability companies) contained a more picturesque (but equally emphatic) description of the foibles
of the series concept. Sent by a practitioner who had been one of the ABA Business
Law Section Advisors to the Re-ULLCA Drafting Committee, the posting stated:
Series, as I understand them, originated in the mutual fund and structured finance
realms. Asset/liability partitioning is there not a significant issue as the possibility
of tort liability is low and insurance is available. That statement would not true is a
series of a fund defaulted on lets say a significant derivative contract, but I have not
seen that case.
But let’s step away from that realm. What is the reason that series are being considered /adopted outside of Delaware? What need is filled in the practical world (you
know, the one in which Larry Curly and Moe open a factory at 1 Blackacre Lane to
make widgets) by the series? In light of the at best significant (overwhelming?) issues
of indefinite federal and state taxation, securities compliance (please raise your hand
if you are willing to issue a clean non-consolidation opinion between offerings of
series), drafting complexity, the issue of whether the internal liability shield will be
respected in states that do not have series provisions, and the ultimate possibility that
the bankruptcy is going to consolidate all of the series into the parent, why would you
use a series LLC/LP in the practical world?

149. The draft provided, inter alia, that: “The articles of organization may provide that a designated
series shall be treated as a separate entity distinct from the limited liability company, other series of the
limited liability company, and members. . . . A designated series has the capacity to sue and be sued in
its own name and the power to do all things necessary or convenient to carry on its activities.” ULLCA
II Series Draft, § 210(i) and (k), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006FebSerDraft.
htm (last visited 11/26/2006).
150. Progress Report, supra note 12, at 9 (citations omitted).
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For me it is not enough (sorry, it is not even on the radar screen) that I can avoid
needing to form multiple SMLLCs [single member limited liability companies] to
segregate liabilities and assets. That cost is de minimus and I am pretty sure I know
the requirements and effect of doing so.
Sorry, I just have not seen a compelling case for series outside of the mutual fund
and structured finance area.151

A subsequently posted suggestion that administrative costs might be lower with
a series LLC than with a set of single-member LLCs drew the following response
from the practitioner who had served as the principal ABA Advisor to the ReULLCA Drafting Committee:
While I have mixed feelings about series, . . . . I would be surprised if the savings in filing
fees in any but the most regressively taxed of states would approach the marginal costs
in terms of legal and record-keeping of series. I understand that people have found significant benefits of series in some specialized circumstances such as securitization and
international contexts, and those benefits in some highly lawyered deals may be worthwhile, but the cost of setting up or maintaining series would not seem an appropriate
consideration. If the client is spending less on keeping track of the series interests that he/
she/it would on maintaining separate SMLLCS, the client is probably doing it wrong.152

Certainly the debate over series LLCs will continue.

O. THE LOT OF “MERE” TRANSFEREES
Under the new Act, absent a contrary agreement:
• a person who ceases to be a member of an LLC, for any reason, has no “pay
out” right and becomes solely a transferee of the person’s own transferable
interest;153
• the transferee of a transferable interest does not become a member, has no
governance rights and virtually no information rights, regardless of whether
the transfer was voluntary, involuntary, gratuitous, or for consideration;154
• members may alter the operating agreement and affect a transferee’s rights,
without the consent of the transferee;155
• the LLC’s duration is perpetual156 and a transferee has no right to seek dissolution,157 which means that the transferee is “locked in” to its status in
perpetuity, or until the members decide otherwise.
151. Posted by Thomas E. Rutledge, Sat. Oct 21, 2006 5:39 am (PDT) (copy on file with The Business Lawyer). This posting occurred after and outside of the Re-ULLCA drafting process.
152. Robert E. Keatinge (sent to lnet-llc@yahoogroups.com; Monday, October 23, 2006 at 3:22 p.m.,
on file with The Business Lawyer). Lin Hanson, who helped devise the series provisions of the Illinois
statute, subsequently stated: “That would surely be true in Illinois.” (sent to lnet-llc@yahoogroups.com;
Friday, October 27, 2006 1:52 p.m., on file with The Business Lawyer). These postings also occurred
after and outside of the Re-ULLCA drafting process.
153. Re-ULLCA § 603(a)(3).
154. Id. §§ 502 and 410(f).
155. Id. § 112(b).
156. Id. § 104(c).
157. Id. § 701.
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Extreme as this situation may appear, it is consistent with partnership law
precedent158 and the “pick your partner” principle that is at the core of LLC
law.159 The Drafting Committee struggled with the issue of transferee vulnerability, and under several “meeting” drafts transferees had standing to seek dissolution in circumstances of egregious misconduct.160 However, the Committee
was unable to determine how to avoid transferee vulnerability without giving
transferees the power to “freeze the deal” and interfere in governance via threat
of litigation.161
In its final regularly scheduled meeting, the Drafting Committee excised the
provision giving transferees standing.162 A Comment acknowledges that the Act
itself will not be the final word on this issue:
The law of unincorporated business organizations is only beginning to grapple in a
modern way with the tension between the rights of an organization’s owners to carry
on their activities as they see fit (or have agreed) and the rights of transferees of the
organization’s economic interests. (Such transferees can include the heirs of business
founders as well as former owners who are “locked in” as transferees of their own
interests). . . . This Act does not address the question of whether, in extreme circumstances, transferees might be able to claim some type of duty or obligation to protect
against expropriation.163

158. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. (discussing Bauer v. Blomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture, 849 P2d
1365 (Alaska 1993). See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][e]. However, until ULPA
(2001), § 104(c) provided a perpetual term for limited partnerships, partnership law did not have to
take into account the problem of perpetual lock-in. See UPA § 32(2) (permitting an assignee to seek
judicial dissolution of an at-will general partnership at any time and of a partnership for a term or undertaking if partnership continues in existence after the completion of the term or undertaking); RUPA
§ 801(6) (same except adding the requirement that the court determine that dissolution is equitable);
ULLCA § 801(5) (same as RUPA). Moreover, the partnership cases are few in number and may not
hold in the context of a business entity that has become the vehicle of choice not only for sophisticated
entrepreneurs but also for mom, pop, and the neighbors down the street.
159. Re-ULLCA § 502 cmt. See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][a][iv] and Kleinberger, Prism, supra note 73, at 842, 863.
160. For example, the February 2006 Meeting Draft § 701(a)(5) provided for court ordered dissolution “on application by a member, a dissociated member that has retained a transferable interest, or
a transferee, . . .on the grounds that the managers or those members in control of the limited liability
company: (A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or (B) have
acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” (emphasis added). The February 2006 Meeting Draft is available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006febmtg.htm.
161. See Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. (“If the law categorically favors the owners, there is a serious
risk of expropriation and other abuse. On the other hand, if the law grants former owners and other
transferees the right to seek judicial protection, that specter can “freeze the deal” as of the moment an
owner leaves the enterprise or a third party obtains an economic interest.”).
162. Compare the February 2006 Meeting Draft, § 701(a)(5) with the 2006 Annual Meeting Draft,
§ 701(a)(5).
163. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. The reference to “heirs of business founders” recalls the seminal
close corporation case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(Mass. 1975). If the entity in Donahue had been an LLC formed under the new Act, it would have
been necessary for the court to go outside to Act to find a cause of action for the widow of one of the
company’s two founders.
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IV. A ROADMAP THROUGH INTRICACY—THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
A. THE BROAD SCOPE AND UNFETTERED SOURCES OF THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT
Jurisdictions from coast to coast and from border to border agree that the operating agreement is foundational to any LLC.164 “A limited liability company is as
much a creature of contract as of statute,”165 and, accordingly, the new Act devotes
a definition and three major operational sections to the operating agreement.166
The Act defines the operating agreement in very broad terms:
“Operating agreement” means the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination
thereof, of all the members of a limited liability company, including a sole member,
concerning the matters described in Section 110(a). The term includes the agreement
as amended or restated.167

This definition contains no “statute of frauds.”168 To the contrary, the phrase
“whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof ” means that—
at least so far as the Act is concerned—the contents of the operating agreement

164. Denevi v. Green Valley Corp., No. CV784721, 2005 WL 236386, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
21, 2005) (“[i]n general, relations among members and between the members and a limited liability
company are governed by articles of organization and an operating agreement”); Elf Atochem N. Am.,
Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (“‘[i]t is the policy of [the Act] to give the maximum
effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.’”) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)); Kinke v. R.D.C., LLC, 889 So.2d 405,
409 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“An operating agreement, whether written or oral, governs the operation of
the LLC . . . [a]n operating agreement is contractual in nature; thus, it binds the members of the LLC as
written and is interpreted pursuant to contract law”); Lentricular Eur., LLC v. Cunnally, 693 N.W.2d
302, 307 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (“[t]he numerous opportunities for members of an LLC to choose to be
governed by terms that differ from those in the statute plainly express the legislature’s intent to provide
LLC members with the flexibility to define many aspects of their relationship by contract,” but holding
when operating agreement is ambiguous as to whether it intended to override statutory provisions, the
statutory provisions govern). See generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 5.06 [1] [b].
165. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
166. Id. §§ 110–12. In addition, “An operating agreement is a contract, and therefore all statutory
language pertaining to the operating agreement must be understood in the context of the law of contracts.” Id. § 102(13) cmt.
167. Id. § 102(13).
168. As to whether other statutes of fraud might apply, see Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt. (“This Act
states no rule as to whether the statute of frauds applies to an oral operating agreement. Case law
suggests that an oral agreement to form a partnership or joint venture with a term exceeding one
year is within the statute. See, e.g.¸ Abbott v. Hurst, 643 So.2d 589, 592 (Ala. 1994) (“Partnership
agreements, like other contracts, are subject to the Statute of Frauds. A contract of partnership for a
term exceeding one year is within the Statute of Frauds and is void unless it is in writing; however, a
contract establishing a partnership terminable at the will of any partner is generally held to be capable
of performance by its terms within one year of its making and, therefore, to be outside the Statute of
Frauds.”) (citations omitted); Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Const. Co., 244 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1951)
(rejecting plaintiff’s contention that mere part performance sufficed to take the oral agreement outside
the statute and holding that partnership was therefore at will); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int’l, Ltd., 739 F.2d
812, 827–28 (2d Cir.1984) (same analysis with regard to a joint venture). However, it is not possible
to form an LLC without signing and delivering to the filing officer a certificate of organization in record
form, Re-ULLCA § 201(a), and the Act itself then establishes the LLC’s duration. Subject to the operating agreement, that duration is perpetual. Id. § 104(c). An oral provision of an operating agreement
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can be established by words, written or spoken, conduct, or some combination of
these. The one mechanical requirement is assent: “Absent a contrary provision in
the operating agreement, a threshold qualification for status as part of the ‘operating agreement’ is the assent of all the persons then members.”169
The Act does not specifically empower the operating agreement to impose a
private statute of frauds—i.e., to provide that amendments must be in writing.170
However, Section 110(a)(4) empowers the operating agreement to determine “the
means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.” According to the
Comment to that provision, “Paragraph (a)(4) could be read to encompass such
authorization.”171 Moreover, “under Section 107 [supplemental principles of law]
the parol evidence rule will apply to a written operating agreement containing an
appropriate merger provision.”172

B. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF SECTION 110
Section 110 is the most intricate of the sections dealing with the operating
agreement, and most of its intricacy concerns the “complex question[] . . . [of] the
calling for performance that extends beyond a year might be within the one-year provision—e.g., an
oral agreement that a particular member will serve (and be permitted to serve) as manager for three
years. An oral provision of an operating agreement which involves the transfer of land, whether by
or to the LLC, might come within the land provision of the statute of frauds. Froiseth v. Nowlin, 287
P. 55, 56 (Wash. 1930) (“[The land provision] applies to an oral contract to transfer or convey partnership real property, and the interest of the other partners therein, to one partner as an individual, as
well as to a parol contract by one of the parties to convey certain land owned by him individually to
the partnership, or to another partner, or to put it into the partnership stock.”) (quoting 27 CORPUS
JURIS 220).”). In contrast, the fact that a limited liability company owns or deals in real property does
not bring within the land provision agreements pertaining to the LLC’s membership interests. Interests
in a limited liability company are personal property and reflect no direct interest in the entity’s assets.
Re-ULLCA §§ 501 & 102(21). Thus, the real property issues pertaining to the LLC’s ownership of land
do not “flow through” to the members and membership interests. See, e.g., Wooten v. Marshall, 153
F. Supp. 759, 763–64 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (involving an “oral agreement for a joint venture concerning
the purchase, exploitation and eventual disposition of this 160 acre tract” and stating “[t]he real property acquired and dealt with by the venturers takes on the character of personal property as between
the partners in the enterprise, and hence is not covered by [the Statute of Frauds].”). For other landrelated consequences of the LLC’s status as a separate entity, see BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19,
¶ 5.05 [1][e] (“An LLC’s separate legal status also affects property rights. A member’s contribution of
property to an LLC constitutes ‘more than a change in the form of ownership; it is a transfer from one
entity to another.’ This change means that contributed property is out of the reach of the contributor’s
creditors, unless that creditor can make a case of fraudulent transfer or persuade the court to do a
reverse pierce, treating the LLC as if it were the member. Where real property is involved, the change
in ownership implicates real estate transfer taxes and means that the former owner of property contributed to an LLC lacks standing to contest zoning activities pertaining to the property. Similarly,
members deadlocked over the use of an LLC’s real property have no right to a partition of that property
and evidence of unjust enrichment as to the property of an LLC is not, by itself, evidence of unjust
enrichment as to the sole owner of the LLC.”).
169. Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt. See id. § 407(b)(5) (“The operating agreement may be amended
only with the consent of all members.”) (member-managed LLC) and id. § 407(c)(4)(D) (“The consent
of all members is required to . . . amend the operating agreement.”) (manager-managed LLC).
170. Compare U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (permitting a written contract for the sale of goods to preclude
modifications except through a writing signed by the parties).
171. Re-ULLCA § 110(a)(4) cmt.
172. Id.
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extent to which an agreement among the organization’s owners can affect the law
of fiduciary duty.”173 The Comment to Section 110 provides the following “roadmap” to the section:
Subsection (a)
Subsection (b)

Subsection (c)

Subsection (d)

Subsection (e)

Subsection (f)

Subsection (g)

Subsection (h)

grants broad, general authority to the operating agreement
establishes this Act as comprising the “default rules” (“gap fillers”)
for matters within the purview of the operating agreement but not
addressed by the operating agreement
states restrictions on the power of the operating agreement, especially but not exclusively with regard to fiduciary duties and the
contractual obligation of good faith
contains specific grants of authority for the operating agreement
with regard to fiduciary duty and the contractual obligation of
good faith; expressed so as to state restrictions on those specific
grants—including the “if not manifestly unreasonable” standard
specifically grants the operating agreement the power to provide
mechanisms for approving or ratifying conduct that would otherwise violate the duty of loyalty; expressed so as to state restrictions on those mechanism—full disclosure and disinterested and
independent decision makers
specifically authorizes the operating agreement to divest a member
of fiduciary duty with regard to a matter if the operating agreement
is also divesting the person of responsibility for the matter (and
imposing that responsibility on one or more other members)
contains specific grants of authority for the operating agreement
with regard to indemnification and exculpatory provisions; expressed so as to state restrictions on those specific grants
provides rules for applying the “not manifestly unreasonable”
standard established by subsection (d)

It is important to remember that Section 110(a) states the most important general principle regarding the operating agreement. Except as specifically and expressly limited by other provisions of the Act, it is the operating agreement—not
the Act—which provides for the members the “rules of the game.”174

C. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
The Act’s most important and intricate limitations apply when the operating
agreement eliminates, limits, or delineate some aspect of fiduciary duty. Section
110 expressly authorizes such provisions—other than the wholesale elimination
of all fiduciary duty—and establishes a two-layered approach for dealing with
challenges.

173. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
174. The operating agreement also governs a small set of non-members. Re-ULLCA § 110(a)(2)
(stating that the operating agreement governs “the rights and duties under this [act] of a person in
the capacity of manager”), id. § 112(b) (providing that the operating agreement controls the rights of
transferees and dissociated members).
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The first layer involves the reach of the challenged provision. The following
chart appears in the Comment to Section 110(d)(3):
duty

extent of operating agreement’s power to restrict
the duty(subject to the
“manifestly unreasonable”
standard)Section
110(d)(1), (3) and (4)

power of the operating
agreement to provide
indemnity or exculpation
w/r/t breach of the
dutySection 110(g)

loyalty

restrict or completely
eliminate

none

care

alter, but not eliminate;
specifically may not authorize intentional misconduct or
knowing violation of law

complete

other fiduciary
duties, not
codified in the
statute

restrict or completely
eliminate

complete

The second layer involves the “not manifestly unreasonable” standard, which Section 110(d) imposes and Section 110(h) explicates. Subsection (h) is protective of
the operating agreement and provides: “The court shall decide any claim under
subsection (d) that a term of an operating agreement is manifestly unreasonable.”
The “manifestly unreasonable” standard has been part of the law of unincorporated
business organizations since the adoption of RUPA,175 but subsection (h) is entirely
new. The Comment to subsection (h) explains the subsection’s rationale and purpose:
The “not manifestly unreasonable standard” became part of uniform business entity
statutes when RUPA imported the concept from the Uniform Commercial Code. This
subsection provides rules for applying that standard, which are necessary because:

• Determining unreasonableness inter se owners of an organization is a different task than doing so in a commercial context, where concepts like
“usages of trade” are available to inform the analysis. Each business organization must be understood in its own terms and context.
• If loosely applied, the standard would permit a court to rewrite the members’ agreement, which would destroy the balance this Act seeks to establish between freedom of contract and fiduciary duty.
• Case law research indicates that courts have tended to disregard the significance of the word “manifestly.”
175. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i), (b)(5).
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• Some decisions have considered reasonableness as of the time of the complaint, which means that a prospectively reasonable allocation of risk
could be overturned because it functioned as agreed.176
An example illustrates the importance of the “as of when” issue.
EXAMPLE: When a particular manager-managed LLC comes into existence, its business plan is quite unusual and its success depends on the willingness of a particular
individual to serve as the LLC’s sole manager. This individual has a rare combination
of skills, experiences, and contacts, which are particularly appropriate for the LLC’s
start-up. In order to induce the individual to accept the position of sole manager, the
members are willing to have the operating agreement significantly limit the manager’s
fiduciary duties. Several years later, when the LLC’s operations have turned prosaic
and the manager’s talents and background are not nearly so crucial, a member challenges the fiduciary duty limitations as manifestly unreasonable. The relevant time
under subsection (h)(1) is when the LLC began. Subsequent developments are not
relevant, except as they might inferentially bear on the circumstances in existence at
the relevant time.177

D. THE EXPANSIVE REACH OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT—TO
TRANSFEREES, DISSOCIATED MEMBERS, INCOMING MEMBERS,
MANAGERS, AND THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITSELF
Under the new Act, an operating agreement is both a contract178 and more than
a contract. The Act defines “operating agreement” to include a contract with only
one party179 and, in Sections 111 and 112, provides that the operating controls the
rights of specified non-parties.
In some respects, giving the operating agreement’s “extraterritorial” power is
sensible and even traditional. For example, Section 112(b) provides: “The obligations of a limited liability company and its members to a person in the person’s
capacity as a transferee or dissociated member are governed by the operating
agreement.”180 A transferee is, in effect, the assignee of the transferor’s economic
rights, and a person dissociated as a member relates to the LLC as if the transferee
of the person’s own transferable interest.181 It is hornbook contract law that an assignee “stands in the shoes” of the assignor and is governed by the contract.182
Likewise it makes sense for Section 111(b) to provide: “A person that becomes
a member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to the operating
agreement.”183 Because “[a] limited liability company is as much a creature of
176. Re-ULLCA § 110(h) cmt. The Comment also notes: “If a person claims that a term of the
operating agreement in manifestly unreasonable under subsections (d) and (h), as a matter of ordinary
procedural law the burden is on the person making the claim.” Id.
177. Id. § 110(h)(1) cmt.
178. See the discussion supra at notes 28–34, 165 and accompanying text.
179. See the discussion supra at notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
180. Re-ULLCA § 112(b).
181. Id. § 603(a)(3).
182. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.8 (4th ed. 2004).
183. Re-ULLCA § 111(b).
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contract as of statute,”184 membership in an LLC is inextricably and inevitably
connected with being party to the operating agreement.
Other aspects of the operating agreement’s reach are not so traditional or selfevidently sensible. Most remarkably, the Act breaks with the common law of contracts and provides that transferee rights are subject to changes in the operating
agreement that occur after the transfer. Section 112(b) states:
Subject only to any court order issued under Section 503(b)(2) to effectuate a charging order, an amendment to the operating agreement made after a person becomes a
transferee or dissociated member is effective with regard to any debt, obligation, or
other liability of the limited liability company or its members to the person in the
person’s capacity as a transferee or dissociated member.185

The Drafting Committee adopted this provision to avoid the “specter” of “former owners and other transferees” being able to “ ‘freeze the deal’ as of the moment an owner leaves the enterprise or a third party obtains an economic interest”
in the LLC.186 Contract law is to the contrary,187 and the danger is that “[i]f the law
categorically favors the owners, there is a serious risk of expropriation and other
abuse.”188
The operating agreement also governs “the rights and duties under this [act]
of a person in the capacity of manager,”189 even though a non-member manager
might not be party to the operating agreement.190 A non-member manager has at
least two methods of self-protection: entering into a separate agreement with the
LLC, the breach of which (through changes in the operating agreement) would
provide the manager remedies; or insisting that the operating agreement include
provisions that (i) specify the manager’s rights and duties, and (ii) give the manager veto power over any amendments pertaining to those rights and duties.
Section 112(a) expressly authorizes veto rights for non-members (following
Delaware law),191 and the Comment to that subsection provides an example involving a manager’s self-protection:
EXAMPLE: A non-member manager enters into a management contract with the
LLC, and that agreement provides in part that the LLC may remove the manager
without cause only with the consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits interests.
The operating agreement contains a parallel provision, but the non-member manager
is not a party to the operating agreement. Later the LLC members amend the operating agreement to change the quantum to a simple majority and thereafter purport to
184. Id. § 110 cmt.
185. Id. § 112(b).
186. Id. § 112(b) cmt. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra notes 153–63 and
accompanying text (Section III-O).
187. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][e].
188. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt.
189. Id. § 110(a)(2).
190. The Act defines the operating agreement as “the agreement, whether or not referred to as an
operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all the
members,” Re-ULLCA § 102(13), but does not expressly rule out a non-member being a party. ReULLCA § 407(c)(6) recognizes that “[a] person need not be a member to be a manager.”
191. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-302(e) (2007).
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remove the manager without cause. Although the LLC has undoubtedly breached its
contract with the manager and subjected itself to a damage claim, the LLC has the
power under Section 110(a)(2) to effect the removal—unless the operating agreement provided the non-member manager a veto right over changes in the quantum
provision.192

The new Act also provides a special rule for the relationship of the operating
agreement to the limited liability company. Section 111(a) states: “A limited liability company is bound by and may enforce the operating agreement, whether
or not the company has itself manifested assent to the operating agreement.”193
As a theoretical matter, the Act seems again at odds with the basic constructs of
contract law.194 As a practical matter, however, the rule is certainly desirable.

V. CONCLUSION
Statute drafting is a craft, in many ways analogous to designing and building by
hand an intricate and beautiful cabinet. The authors of this article (co-reporters
for the Drafting Committee) hope that business lawyers and legislators will find
Re-ULLCA well designed, well crafted, and ready for use.

192. Re-ULLCA § 112(a) cmt.
193. Id. § 111(a).
194. In general, only parties to a contract are fully entitled to enforce it and fully subject to its
provisions. For example, an assignee’s claims are subject to the contract, but the assignee itself is not
directly liable for any breach of the contract. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Campbell Design Group, Inc., 914
S.W.2d 43, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (“What is not discussed by [the company] is the basic legal premise
that a contract generally binds no one but the parties thereto, and it cannot impose any contractual
obligation or liability on one not a party to it. The record does not establish that either of the individual
defendants was a party to the contract. Language in a contract to which they were not parties cannot
bind them.”) (citations omitted.) See generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Crack in the Shield? Malpractice
Coverage At Risk, 63 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 26 (September 2006). For a hypothesis of why the new Act
(and other LLC statutes) avoid deeming the LLC a party to the operating agreement, see Prism, supra
note 73, at 870–71.
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